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This article investigates the determinants of board compensation for a
sample of Italian state owned enterprises (SOEs). To that purpose, we use
newly colected panel data of 106 local public utilities observed from 1994
through 2004, which includes detailed information on the boards of direc-
tors. During this period, the deregulation process inspired institutional inter-
ventions that forced utilities, traditionaly owned by local municipalities, to
change their juridical form and ownership structure, thereby facilitating the
entrance of private investors. The corporate governance literature shows that
such changes may exacerbate the agency conflicts between shareholders, top
executives and the board. However, board compensation could reduce the
agency costs by aligning the incentives of managers with the interests of
shareholders. This article addresses this issue by investigating the impact
that board composition,firm characteristics and performance have on board
compensation. Wefind that the average board pay is positively related to
firm dimension and negatively related to board size. The public or private
nature of the major shareholder does not influence board compensation but
the juridical form does. Finaly, while the proportion of politicaly connected
directors is found to negatively influence the level of per capita compensa-
tion, the impact offirm performance is uncertain.
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I. Introduction
The remuneration of board of directors, as wel as the
compensation packages of CEOs and other top executives,
represents an internal corporate governance instrument
aimed at providing them with the right incentives to
behave in the best interests of the shareholders. The mon-
itoring and advising functions of boards are jeopardized
by the coordination and agency problems that they might
sufer, so that providing directors with incentivizing remu-
neration schemes (in terms of both the absolute monetary
value of total compensation as wel as an appropriate mix
betweenfixed cash salary and variable–i.e. performance
related components) becomes important. While CEOs’
pay has been a hot topic in the economic literature during
the last decade, compensation of the board as a whole has
received minor atention. Indeed, most research on board
of directors has centred on independence more than on
incentives. However, as highlighted by Crespi-Cladera
and Gispert (2003), the focus on board remuneration is
justified by the redefinition of the agency problem, where
the CEO and top executives are responsible to the board,
and the board in turn is responsible towards the
shareholders.
Most contributions on the determinants and the efects
of compensation packages concern listedfirms, while, as
acknowledged by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), not
much is known about board decision making in nonprivate
sector entities. The private sector usualy defines the best
practice standard, and it is almost uniform practice for
governments to seek to improve the performance of
SOEs by emulating the private sector’s practices (see, for
example, OECD,2006). To that respect, in order to atract
wel-qualified and experienced executives and board
members, eforts must be made to include rewards in the
compensation schemes. However, for reasons of fairness
and in order to avoid public controversy over unequal and
excessive pay in the public sector, there are serious con-
cerns about the extensive use of incentive remuneration
schemes for companies owned by central or local
governments.
As a general rule, Governments tend to regulate and limit
the remuneration and incentive awards of both executives
and board members of SOEs. Some countries have policies
that seek to align pay with market rates but not be market
leading. Others prescribe remuneration levels. These pre
scriptions may be supplemented by prohibitions on share
options, or restrictions on bonuses (Frederick,2011,p.21).
The purpose of this article is to shed some light on the
determinants of directors’compensation in SOEs. In parti-
cular, we analyse per capita board compensation in a sample
of 106 Italian local public utilities observed over the years
1994–2004. During this period, the liberalization process
has changed the industrial and institutional landscape of the
sector. From a corporate governance point of view, new
rules were established for the utilities’juridical forms, own-
ership structure and board composition. Until the nineties,
Italian local public utilities were traditionalyfirms emanat-
ing from the controling State (often local) body. From the
initial status of‘Azienda Municipalizzata’,1they have
sometimes evolved into a transitional juridical form caled
‘Azienda Speciale’, in which managers enjoyed greater
control over thefirm’s strategy. Nowadays, a large majority
of Italian public utilities are limited companies with proper
board of directors, in which both public and private entities
can invest according to a process labeledcorporatization.
The declared intention of such a transformation was to
facilitate the evolution of the sector toward a more compe-
titive and market-oriented organization in which local pub-
lic utilities stil controled by municipal governments would
nonetheless appear more similar to privatefirms in their
management practices and objectives. To be more specific,
the corporatization process should alowfirms to be mana-
ged with less interference by politicians, with a beter
knowledge of the real cost of the service, with a more
flexible management of labour. The direction of the com-
panies should be entrusted to professional managers and,
accordingly, the presence of bureaucrats in key managerial
positions should be reduced. There should be higher
degrees of freedom as far as personnel hiring and promo-
tion, procurement and long-term investment budgetary
operations are concerned.2
In this perspective, it is important to analyse whether the
corporate governance mechanisms are working in publicly
owned utilities as they do in private companies. In this
article, we focus our atention on the compensation of
boards of directors and put it into relation with sector and
firm characteristics such as size, profitability, ownership
structure, board composition and juridical form. During
the decade under investigation (1994–2004), most Italian
public utilities were stil controled by state entities and their
boards were dominated by government representatives. For
this reason, in this article we do not make a generic distinc-
tion between executives (inside) and nonexecutive (out-
side) directors, as is often the case in the literature, but we
disentangle‘independent’versus‘not independent’outsi-
ders, and we take into account also the political connection
1 This is an autonomous legal entity emanatingde factofrom the sovereign government, with a board of directors (caled‘Commission’)
which is directly nominated by the state owner.
2 Corporatization is expected to bring also labour costs savings, since the salaries of utilities with the‘limited company’juridical form
should be set at levels equal to the ones prevailing in the colective contracts in the private sector. The later are generaly lower than the
wages paid to the workers in the public sector.
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of board members, by distinguishing between‘politicaly
connected’and‘nonpoliticaly connected’directors.
By folowing an empirical strategy that accounts for
potential endogenous problems of board composition
and performance regressors, wefind that both board size
and board composition mater for director’s compensation.
Infirms where boards are bigger and dominated by politi-
cians, remunerations are lower. On the contrary, per capita
pay increases for bigfirms and for utilities that take on the
limited company form. Finaly, the estimates show that
there is not a clear-cut relationship between performance
and the average compensation of board of directors.
The remainder of the article is organized as folows.
Section I reviews the relevant literature that mostly con-
centrates on private listedfirms. Section II explains the
definitions adopted, describes the data set and shows some
first descriptive statistics. Section IV ilustrates the econo-
metric model and presents the main results of our empiri-
cal analysis. Section V concludes.
I. Literature Review
While several studies have examined the determinants of
executive compensation as wel as the relationship between
executive compensation andfirm performance (see, among
others, the recent reviews by Kaplan (2012)and Goergen
and Renneboog (2011), the literature on incentive schemes
for boards of directors (as a whole, as a function of their
composition and in relation tofirm performance) is not
wel developed yet. After the explosion of corporate scan-
dals that, starting from 2001, burst over thefinancial mar-
kets in the US and in Europe, practitioners, politicians and
scholars have been much more critical in evaluating boards
of directors as an efective corporate governance instru-
ment for monitoring the behaviour of managers and pro-
tecting the interests of shareholders. Most of the literature
has highlighted the importance of having smal boards and
a relevant fraction of independent directors. More recently,
and for listedfirms only, the remuneration of boards of
directors as an incentive to beter control the management
has become a relevant topic in thefinancial literature
(Adamset al.,2010).
In the literature, admitedly, there is a sort of confusion
between managerial compensation, CEO pay, executive
and nonexecutive director pay and total or average board
compensation. For example, some papers concentrate on
outside director compensation only (Boyd, 1996;
Yermack, 2004), others on CEOs’remuneration only
(Gregget al.,1993; Firthet al.,2007) and some others
on both. Among the later, some papers present separate
estimates for CEO compensation, outside director com-
pensation and total board compensation (Mainet al.,
1996; Ryan and Wiggins,2004; Bricket al.,2006;
Fernandes,2008), while others analyse total board pay
only(Crespi-Cladera and Gispert,2003; Fengetal.,
2007;Barontini and Bozzi,2011).
This confusion, however, is partialy justified by the
fact that CEOs are both managers and, since they
usualy sit in the board of directors, executive direc-
tors.3Given our interest in board compensation, our
literature review wil be limited to the papers dealing
with the compensation packages of directors and, to a
lesser extent, of CEOs.4
The determinants of compensation: firm size and board
size
Firm size is considered in a number of papers as an
important variable explaining board as wel as CEO com-
pensation. The complexity of the job, the skils required,
the number of hierarchical structures and the ability to pay,
al point toward largerfirms paying their directors more.
Most studies confirm that remunerations increase with
firm size, as measured by sales, total assets or invested
capital. Gabaix and Landier (2008)push the analysis for-
ward so as to sustain that firm size, without any other
variable, can explain almost completely the variation of
the level of CEOs’compensation.
For board members other than the CEO, Bricket al.
(2006), using a sample of 1400 USfirms observed from
1992 to 2001, highlight that director remuneration is posi-
tively related to the difficulty of the directors’tasks as
proxied byfirm size. However, in the second step of their
analysis, theyfind a positive relation between CEO com-
pensation and director compensation. This result could be
due to the fact that large and complexfirms are requiring
skiled managers and higher levels of efort, or it could
otherwise reflect cronyism, where top executives and
directors are pursuing their own interests against the inter-
ests of shareholders (‘mutual back scratching’). Since they
find evidence of a negative link between excess compen-
sation (the residuals from the pay-for-performance regres-
sion) andfirm performance (as measured by future excess
returns), the authors conclude that overcompensation
3 In many circumstances, CEOs’remuneration is computed by including the salary. While this is obviously corect for investigating the
determinants and the efects of CEO compensation, when analysing total board compensation (which should include the annual cash
retainer for each director, the fee for each board meeting and the fee for commitee meetings), the computation of CEO and other
executive board members wages has the efect of sharply increasing average board pay. This makes the board compensation measure less
connected to the monitoring and advising eforts of the board, which is the topic on which we concentrate our atention in this article.
4 The reader interested in managerial compensation can refer, for example, to Murphy (1999), Goergen and Renneboog (2011)and
Kaplan (2012).
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of directors and CEOs is related to firm’s future
underperformance.
While the positive impact of firm size on compensation is
clear, the link between board size, CEO compensation and
overal board compensation is uncertain. There are two
possible efects. On the one hand, large boards of directors
are likely to have a wider level of expertise which could
enhance their monitoring, align incentives and increase
board compensation while reducing CEO pay. On the
other hand, they can grow so oversized that they become
inefective in coordinating and accomplishing their role of
monitoring the executive management, which would lead
to higher (lower) CEO (board) compensation.5
Given the above two opposite efects, relatively few
empirical papers have included board size among the
regressors in their investigation of the determinants of
compensation.6Ryan and Wiggins (2004),usingasample
of 1018 USfirms observed for years 1995–1997, show
evidence of a negative relationship between board size
and total director remuneration (which includes cash and
equity-based compensation but does not include the CEO’s
wage), as wel as of lower shares of incentive-based com-
pensation for boards who are dominated by the CEO and by
insider directors. Assuming that large boards are less efec-
tive in fulfiling their monitoring role, the negative impact
of board size suggests that (suboptimal) director compensa-
tion reinforces monitoring bariers. Their results suggest the
importance of outsider and independent directors for con-
trasting the CEO’s power and for devising board compen-
sation schemes more aligned with the interests of
shareholders. In a similar vein, Fenget al.(2007),usinga
sample of 136 US real estate investment trusts (REITs) for
2001,find that total director compensation (which does not
include the CEO’s wage) is significantly negatively related
to board size and positively related tofirm size and perfor-
mance. They alsofind that, when CEOs are involved in the
nomination of directors, equity-based compensation of
board members is used less, and conclude that CEOs influ-
ence board compensation and that they do so in a way that,
instead of mitigating the agency problem, exacerbates it.7
Other determinants of board compensation: board
composition and the role of outsiders
Fernandes (2008)analyses in detail the role of nonexecu-
tive board members, who are expected to act to protect the
shareholders’ interests,  i.e.  to  bridge  the  gap
between uninformed shareholders and informed executive
managers. Using a sample of 51 companies listed in the
Portuguese stock market from 2002 to 2004, hefinds that,
contrary toà prioriexpectations,firms with more non-
executive board members pay higher wages to executive
directors and that, infirms with zero nonexecutive board
members, shareholders’and managers’interests are beter
aligned.8The above results impose a reflection on the
efectiveness of independent board members incentive
systems and on their expected monitoring role (see also
Yermack,2004). As stated by the author,‘high compensa-
tion, together with the lack of a competitive labor market,
suggests that there are few incentives for nonexecutive
directors to act as honest guardians of shareholders’inter-
ests. In practice, they have litle to gain from their assigned
role and a lot to lose’(Fernandes,2008, p. 43).
The above cited paper by Fenget al.(2007)also analyses
the link between director’s pay and board composition. The
authorsfind that, when the board includes more nonexecu-
tive members, total board compensation slightly decreases
but total pay to executive board members increases. This
outcome contradicts the expectations from the agency the-
ory (according to which the pay of executive board mem-
bers should be negatively related to the number of
nonexecutives, used as a proxy for the level of monitoring)
but is in line with the above results by Fernandes (2008)and
by Bricket al.(2006), and casts serious doubts about the
real role of outside and independent directors.9
Are al outsiders independent? The above results can
be partialy afected by data colection problems, given the
difficulties encountered by scholars in precisely identify-
ing independent directors.10Independent directors are out-
side directors, i.e. directors who are not curently
employees of thefirm. However, not al outside directors
5 Moreover, although the board is in charge of fixing CEO pay, it could be the case that the CEO also influences board composition and
compensation. Therefore, while, on the one hand, nonexecutives should try to avoid paying CEOs too much, CEOs with bargaining
power, on the other hand, do not alow director compensation to be set to a level conducive to the optimal amount of monitoring.
6 For example, Firthet al.(2007)have tested the hypothesis that‘no relation exists between CEO pay and board size’. Since their
estimates on a sample of 549 listed Chinese companies observed from 1997 to 2000 show evidence of a negative relationship between
board size and CEOs’compensation, the nul hypothesis can be rejected, but the authors do not atempt to ofer an interpretation of such
an outcome.
7 However, while Ryan and Wiggins (2004)found a lower percentage of equity pay for large boards, Fenget al.(2007)did not. Therefore,
the evidence provided by Fenget al.(2007)is less robust and less conclusive as far as the impact of board compensation on bariers to
monitoring is concerned.
8 More precisely, while there is no clear cut relationship between board remuneration and company performance, the results show a
strong and positive relationship between the pay of executive directors and some measures offirm performance.
9 See, on the same issue, Gutiérez Urtiaga and Saez (2012)and Becagliet al.(2013).
10 For example, while Fernandes (2008)and Firthet al.(2007)identified independent directors with nonexecutive board members, Ryan
and Wiggins (2004), Bricket al.(2006)and Fenget al.(2007)used a morefine grained distinction and considered them as a restricted
subcategory of outside directors.
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qualify for independence, since some of them can be
‘gray’or‘affiliated’board members, who are not curently
employed by thefirm but can exert a significant influence
on it being shareholders, suppliers, customers, consul-
tants, former employees or relatives of individuals in
such positions. The residual category of‘independent direc-
tors’should only include outside directors without any
connection, past or present, to thefirm’s management or
its shareholders. However, as pointed out by Adamset al.
(2010, p. 80), it is extremely difficult to disentangle the
category of‘truly independent’directors:‘Outside directors
are often taken to be independent directors, yet the inde-
pendence of some directors who meet the definition of an
outsider is questionable. Examples of such directors are
lawyers or bankers who do business with the company’.
The Italian Corporate Governance Code for listed compa-
nies (Assonime,2013)requiresfirms to clearly identify
executive directors, nonexecutive directors and indepen-
dent directors. Moreover, within the later category,firms
should identify independent directors‘at risk’, where inde-
pendency can be questioned by the fact that the board
members are holding cross-directorship positions in subsi-
diaries, are receiving abnormaly high compensations or are
in the board for more than 9 years. In this article, we folow
the definition of independence provided by the Italian
Corporate Governance Code:11‘A convenient proportion
of non executive directors is represented by independent
directors, who must not be involved in any economic
relationship with thefirm, its executive directors and its
shareholders, cannot execute control or relevant influence
over thefirm and are not relatives of anyone in such a
positions’(p. 21).
Even if corectly identified, some independent board
members may not pursue the expected objectives and/or
may not be endowed with an appropriate monitoring cap-
ability. For example, Pathanet al.(2013)argue that‘busy’
directors, i.e. independent directors that serve in multiple
boards, are poorer monitors offirm managers than‘over-
lapping’directors, i.e. independent directors that serve in
multiple commitees (such as audit, compensation and
nomination commitees) in the same board. Another char-
acteristic which is particular important for our purposes is
the presence of politicians in the board of directors, who
clearly can pursue diferent goals as compared to indepen-
dent directors not involved in political activities. While we
are not able to disentangle busy or overlapping directors,
in this article we duly take into account for the presence of
politicians in the boards.
Ownership structure, regulation and board pay
Barontini and Bozzi (2011) analyse the relationship
between board compensation and ownership structure in
a sample of 215 Italian listedfirms observed in the years
1995–2002. Considering the nature of the ultimate owner,
the level of board compensation is found to be higher for
familyfirms and for widely heldfirms, while board mem-
bers of state owned companies receive a significantly
lower compensation. This later result can be due to the
fact that state-ownedfirms are pursuing objectives other
than profit maximization (for example, they may pursue
political goals such as protecting employment and ofer-
ing low prices to the consumers), so that one should expect
lower levels of compensation and a limited use of perfor-
mance-related pay schemes.
Notwithstanding the recent EU reforms concentrated on
privatization as a mean to solve the inefficiency of the
public sector, SOEs remain prominent in air and rail trans-
port, electricity, gas and water supply, broadcasting, natural
resource extraction, banking and insurance. Most Italian
public utilities are stil state-controled even if the liberal-
ization has alowed the introduction of competitive ele-
ments in their organization and the entrance of private
investors in their capital. The relationship between owner-
ship and (executives and) board compensation is the focus
of an increasing branch of the literature concerning newly
privatizedfirms. Most contributions rely on the Chinese
experience, where the SOEs reform has implied radical
changes in the mechanisms governing executives’compen-
sation but, according to some scholars, has failed to
improve the corporate governance of listedfirms. Firth
et al.(2006,2007) analyse the compensation packages in
Chinese listedfirms and confirm that the ownership struc-
ture has a significant influence on CEOs’pay. In particular,
Chinesefirms with substantial government ownership and
with large outside investors exhibit lower levels of CEO
total compensation.
The literature on director compensation mainly focuses
on nonregulatedfirms. To the extent that regulation is
designed to protect various stakeholders’interests, mon-
itoring may be less important for regulatedfirms. Feng
et al.(2007)work on a sample of regulated firms, the
REITs in the United States. Specificaly, the regulation
on REITs favours ownership concentration and reduces
the threat of hostile takeovers, similarly to what happens in
the SOEs considered in this article. More in general,
regulatedfirms can be subject to political constraints on
executive compensation. The regulator is concerned about
both profits and consumer welfare, and tries to influence
CEOs’and directors’pay in order to avoid excessive lump
sum payouts that would chalenge the prevailing public
sentiment. Consistently with the above arguments,
Joskowet al.(1996)find that, for a sample of 87 US
state-regulated private utilities observed during 1978–
1990, CEOs of regulated firms earn less than their
11 This is known as the‘Codice di autodisciplina’, issued by the Commitee for corporate governance of listedfirms of the Italian Stock
Exchange.
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counterparts in unregulated firms and that their 
compensa-tion scheme is less tied to firm profitability.
Remuneration and firm performance
The empirical literature has not reached conclusive results
as far as the link between the compensation of CEOs and
boards of directors (executives and/or outsiders) andfirm
performance is concerned. The results are mixed, with
evidences of either a positive or negative relationship
between compensation andfirm performance, depending
on the type of remuneration considered (cash, stock, base
salary, variable salary part) and on the chosen measure of
firm performance.
For example, both Boyd (1996), for outsider directors,
and Gregget al.(1993), for CEOs, found that the pay-
performance link was positive in the early 80s and dis-
appeared in the late 80s and in the early 90s. More than
25 years later, Kaplan (2012, p. 29) concludes his review
by stating that‘on average, CEOs are paid for perfor-
mance and penalized for poor performance’, while
Goergen and Renneboog (2011, p. 1075) state the
opposite:‘Whereas it is feasible to compensate CEOs
for the value they create for the shareholders, this is
rarely the case in practice: CEOs seem to benefit from
windfal earnings beyond their control–they are com-
pensated for luck’.
Unfortunately, a complete analysis of the link
between board compensation and firm performance
cannot be undertaken in this article, at least for three
reasons. First, detailed information onthe diferent
components of board compensation is not available
for the samplefirms. Second, most of the utilities in
our sample are not listed, so that there would be no
chance for them to link board compensation to the
stock market value. Third, Italian public utilities do
not implement, or do not publicize through the (public
or not) resources we have explored, any incentive plan
for their directors. On the basis of the results obtained
by the previous literature, we wil includefirm perfor-
mance among the determinants of board compensation.
However, since we are working on a sample of state-
owned local public utilities, we do not expect tofind
board compensation levels that are strongly related to
company performance. Moreover, folowing the discus-
sion in sections headed‘Are al outsiders independent?’
and‘Ownership structure, regulation and board pay’,
we also expect that the presence of politicaly con-
nected directors in the board would act to reduce even
more board remuneration levels.
II. Data Set and Descriptive Statistics
The data set includes economic, technical and governance
variables of 106 Italian public utilities surveyed annualy
in 1994–2004. The panel is unbalanced and the total
number of observations is 715. The majority offirms are
located in the north of Italy,12in particular the ones active
in the energy sector, which were typicaly born as
‘Aziende Municipalizzate’and were subsequently trans-
formed into limited companies.
Information on governance was not included in the ori-
ginal data and its colection makes this data set unique. It
includes the juridical form, the biggest three shareholders’
identity, the board compensation, the name of directors,
their position in the board (chairman, deputy chairman,
CEO, member), their political connection, if any, their
position as insider, outsider or independent directors as
declared in thefirm chart or deducted from their role and
curiculum. According to Italian Civil Code (art. 2383),
board directors are nominated by the General Assembly
and cannot be appointed for a period exceeding three years.
However, the appointment may be renewed and directors
may be removed at any time by the general meeting, with
no loss of entitlement to damages in case of unfair dismis-
sal. The company charter establishes the exact number of
directors or sets a range for its dimension, therefore delegat-
ing to the assembly the ultimate decision about the board
size. Most of the times, the appointment of directors is up to
the controling shareholder, or the local government, who
directly appoints them. In other cases, the blockholders
present lists of candidates and the assembly votes the direc-
tors in the lists. As highlighted by Assonime (2013),inves-
tigating board leadership in Italy is not as straightforward as
in US and UK boards. The top director with delegated
powers is usualy the managing director (Amministratore
Delegato). Where only one managing director is present,
he/she is the CEO, and is appointed by the board of direc-
tors. However, a company may delegate powers to two or
more directors, including the chairman, so a clear-cut iden-
tification of the CEO is difficult since the powers of such
directors are frequently overlapping.
Boardis the number of directors siting on the board.
Outside directorsare board members who are not curent
employees of thefirm, so that they might also cover one of
the top positions, typicaly the chairman, if they have no
executive powers.13As discussed in section headed‘Are
al outsiders independent?’,Independent directorsare a
subset of nonexecutive board members who, according to
the Italian Corporate Governance Code (‘Codice di
Autodisciplina’), do not exhibit any supplier, customer,
12 More precisely, 46% of the firms are located in the north west, 34% in the north east, 10% in the centre and 10% in the south and
islands.
13 Outside directors are not qualified on the basis of their inside stock ownership, because most of the Italian public utilities are totaly
owned by a local or central government, and the category is irelevant.
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interlocking or potential competitor relationship with the
firm. Listed companies in the sample must clearly state if
their directors are independent or not according to the
‘Codice di Autodisciplina’and sometimes nonlisted com-
panies do the same in their balance sheets or charts. For the
remaining nonlisted companies, wefil the missing infor-
mation by directly checking if their directors meet the
above independency requirements. Finaly, Politicaly
connected directorsare identified by their present or past
activity in the political arena, as represented by a political
charge, the membership to a political party, the candidacy
for election. Board members are considered as politicians
if they hold a seat in the parliament or in the municipal,
provincial or regional government at the same time as a
seat in the board, or if they were holding it, or, more
generaly, directors affiliated to a political party and
whose relationship with political parties is wel known.
In order to identify politicians, we run biographical
researches on electronic databases such as FACTIVA,
LEXIS-NEXIS, ABI Inform and Who’s Who in Italy,
and wefiled the missing information by surfing on the
Internet.
Per capita board compensationis computed as total
board compensation that includes al forms of compensa-
tion earned by the directors for siting on the board includ-
ing commissions, bonuses, compensation in kind and
social security contributions, divided by the number of
directors serving on the board. For the reasons explained
in Section I (see footnote 3), it excludes any salary, wage
and related benefits due to the inside directors and
accounted for in the payrols.  According to the
Corporate Governance Code, companies should have a
Remuneration Commitee and a Nomination Commitee
made up of nonexecutives, with a majority of independent
directors. Therefore, the CEO is not expected, at least
directly, to be involved in selecting board members and
infixing their remuneration. In many circumstances, the
detailed composition of board remuneration is not pro-
vided in the annual report, in particular for those compa-
nies that at the beginning of the sample period were in the
‘Azienda Municipalizzata’form and were not obliged to
provide an accuratefinancial reporting. In any case, as far
as bonuses are concerned, we presume that mostfirms do
not have any incentives plan for their directors so that the
variable part would not show up in the compensation.14
Figure 1shows that the average per capita board com-
pensation has increased over time, passing from 20 541
euros in 1994 to 36 396 euros in 2004. This is consistent
with expectations, since the deregulation process of local
public services initiated in Europe in the 1990s was aimed
at bringing corporate governance mechanisms from the
private sector to the public sector. The above remuneration
levels are in line with the one prevailing in privatefirms of
a similar size. For example, a recent survey on Italian
listedfirms (Assonime,2013) highlights that CEOs and
executive chairmen receive a compensation of more than
800 000 euros. Other executive directors receive, on aver-
age, half of the CEO’s remuneration. Nonexecutive direc-
tors (79 000 euros) and independent directors (55 000
euros) receive much lower compensation. If we look at
the sub-sample offirms listed in the nonfinancial sector
and of a smaler size (Smal Cap), we get an average board
pay of around 40 000 euros in 2009, which is very similar
to the one prevailing in our data. Similarfigures are also
Annual per capita board compensation
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1994   1995   1996   1997   1998   1999   2000   2001   2002   2003   2004
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Fig. 1.  Annual per capita board compensation
Note:Per capita board compensationper year, in euros at year 2000 values.
14 In particular, the European Commission recommends as a best practice that nonexecutive directors should not receive share based
remuneration, given possible conflicts of interest and the risk of undermining independence (Ferariniet al.,2009).
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reported by Andreaset al.(2012)for the supervisory
boards of German listedfirms, where the average com-
pensation per director is rather low at some 38 000 euros in
the period 2005–2008.
Table 1summarizes some descriptive statistics for the
profit ratios, the size variables, the composition of the board
of directors, the blockholder type (that is the shareholder,
normaly one, owning the largest proportion of equity), the
juridical form and the industry segment. Al nominal values
have been deflated taking year 2000 as the base-year.Firm
performanceis measured by means of accounting indices
(ROA, ROI and ROE). Market-based measures of perfor-
mance are not available because only 9 out of 106firms are
listed. ROA is computed as EBIT, earnings before interest
and tax expenses (which is equivalent to the operating
profit), over total assets, ROI as EBIT over capital invested
(the sum of equity andfinancial debt) and ROE as the
proportion of Net Income over equity. During the sample
period, Italian public utilities show rather low profitability
rates; the average ROA equals 3.7%, while ROI and ROE
are on average 6.9% and 6.5%, respectively.
On average, boards are composed of less than seven
persons, and sometimes al directors are politicians.
Outside directors are as common as politicians, but most
of them are not independent.
We diferentiate among three blockholders; Prblockis a
dummy variable that identifies private blockholders, while
state entities are divided betweenLblock(equal to one for
local government) andPublock(equal to one for higher
levels of government, like a province, a region, a ministry
or the Central Bank). The local government (Lblock) is the
most popular type of blockholder, folowed in turn by
private owners and by Regional, Provincial, and State
organisms.
The figures concerning the three juridical forms
‘Azienda Municipalizzata’(Azmun),‘Azienda Speciale’
(Azspec) and limited company (Corp)reflect the changes
imposed to the Italian public utilities during the period
1994–2004. Most observations refer to limited companies,
thefinal step in the evolution of the juridical form in the
‘corporatization’process. It is interesting to notice that the
average percentage of independent directors has increased
over time, from 17% in 1994 to 29% in 2004, accompany-
ing the ongoing corporatization process. In fact, the average
value of%Indepis 12% for the juridical formAzmun,19%
for thefirm typeAzspecand 25% for limited companies.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Number observ.   25%   Median   75% Mean   SD
Per capita comp (euro) 715 8993   15 494   30 622   28 236   39 275
ROI 715 0.021   0.050   0.090   0.069   0.098
ROA 715 0.013   0.033   0.056   0.037   0.037
ROE 715 0.007   0.037   0.091   0.065   0.120
Assets (’000 euro) 715 23 024   63 228   179 306   212 623   476 818
Sales (’000 euro) 715 11 625   27 571   85 907   96 910   221 688
N 715 53 164 399 385 673
Board 715 5 7 7 6.143   2.484
Polit 715 4 5 6 5.582   2.493
Indep 715 0 0 2 1.418   2.099
Out 715 4 5 6 5.013   2.454
Mean
Publock 18 0.023
Lblock 550 0.790
Prblock 147 0.187
Azmun 139 0.212
Azspec 179 0.264
Corp 397 0.524
Gas 125 0.166
Water 170 0.218
Electricity 35 0.069
Multiutilities 385 0.547
Notes:Per capita compis the total per capita compensation,ROIis the return on invested capital,ROAis the return on assets,ROEis the
return on equity,Assetsrepresents thefirm total assets,Salesthe revenues,Nthe number of employees,Boardis the board size,Indepis
the number of independent directors,Politis the number of politicaly connected directors,Outis the number of outside directors.
Publockis a dummy variable forfirms whose blockholder is a State entity at the highest level (Ministry, Region, Province, Central Bank,
etc.), whileLblockidentifiesfirms with local governments as blockholders.Prblockis a dummy variable forfirms whose blockholder is a
private entity.Azmun, Azspec, Corpare dummies accounting for the juridical form (Azienda Municipalizzata, Azienda Speciale, and
limited company, respectively).Gas, Water, Electricityare dummies forfirms specialized in one sector only, whileMultiutilitiesidentifies
diversifiedutilities running several businesses.
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Most firms (54%) are diversified into several activities,
mainly in the gas and water segments. The remaining
firms operate in one sector only and are specialized in
the water (22%), gas (17%) and electricity (7%) segment.
While Table 1highlights the dominance of politicians in
the board,Table 2shows that their incidence decreases as
the number of independent directors goes up. A positive
corelation between board size andfirm dimension is also
found. The incidence of politicians in the board is nega-
tively corelated to the profit ratios and to the size variable
Assets. Menozziet al.(2012)analyse in depth the relation-
ship between political connection and performance exist-
ing in Italian local public utilities, andfind robust evidence
of a negative link between the proportion of politicaly
connected directors in the board,% Polit, andfirm profit-
ability. This result suggests that, in order to fuly take
benefit from reforms that involved corporatization and
partial privatization of SOEs, utilities should be beter
sheltered from the influence of politicaly connected
directors.
Table 2highlights that the percentage and the level of
independent directors are positively corelated with both
measures of size AssetsandN, the employment level.
Moreover, per capita compensation is negatively corelated
with board size and with the level and the percentage of
politicians. On the contrary, there is no significant corela-
tion with independent directors; it seems that independent
directors do not influence the level of compensation, while
politicians have a depressing efect on it. The above descrip-
tive statistics are consistent with the arguments developed in
sections headed‘The determinants of compensation:firm
size and board size’through‘Ownership structure, regula-
tion and board pay’about the role of board size and the role
of political influence in shaping compensation levels.
Finaly, as mentioned in Section I, the most consistent
finding in the compensation literature is the positive rela-
tionship between board pay and company size. The corela-
tion matrix inTable 2suggests the same result; per capita
board compensation is positively corelated with diferent
measures of firm dimension: total assets, the number of
employees and (not shown inTable 2) total revenues. We
wil consider these results more rigorously in a context of a
multivariate analysis in the folowing section.
IV. Empirical Analysis
Building upon previous work on the determinants of board
compensation that mostly focused on the realm of private
firms, we estimate the folowing model:
Per capita compit¼ β0þβ1sizeitþβ2Gitþβ3Xit
þλtþηiþεit (1) Tab
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wherePer capita compitis the per capita board compensa-
tion paid byfirmiat timet; sizeitis a measure offirm size;
Gitis a set of governance variables concerning board
composition;Boardis the total board size,% Polit and
% Indep, are the percentage of politicians and independent
directors as a fraction of total board size.15
The vectorXitrepresents a set of industry dummies,
accounting for specialized and diversified utilities:Water,
Electricity, Gas, Multiutilities. For measuringfirm size,
we use a set of dummies,Smal, Medium, Bigindicating
that afirm’s assets fal into the 30th, 60th or greater
percentile, respectively16;λtis a time dummy,ηian indi-
vidual, time invariant variable andεitthe eror term.
In order to duly. take into account the endogeneity pro-
blem afecting the relationship between board compensa-
tion and its size and composition,17we apply diferent
techniques to estimate the general expression in (1). The
first specification is an OLS model (column 1), while Fixed
Efect estimates are obtained by transforming each variable
in the coresponding deviation from the mean byfirm
(column 2). An alternative method for addressing the endo-
geneity of regressors is thefirst-diference transformation,
which removes thefixed efects and avoids the propensity
of the Within Groups transformation to make every
observation of the in-deviation dependent variable endo-
genous to every other for a given individual. In such a
model, the dependent variable and the right hand side
regressors are al transformed infirst-diference, and al
valid lags of the untransformed variables are used as instru-
ments. This is the classical ‘GMM-dif’(Arelano and
Bond,1991). While retaining the original Arelano-Bond
moment conditions for the in-diference equation, that is,
instrumenting variables in diferences with variables in
levels, Blundel and Bond (1998)suggest to‘add’new
conditions and to instrument variables in levels with
variables in diferences; this creates the so-caled
‘GMM-system’estimate. In practice, the model is treated
as a system of equations, one for each time period, where
the predetermined and endogenous variables infirst-difer-
ences are instrumented with suitable lags of their own
levels, and the predetermined and endogenous variables
in levels are instrumented with suitable lags of their own
first diferences. The results of the one-step and two-step
(that uses a consistent estimate of the weighting matrix,
taking the residuals from the one-step estimate) GMM-sys
models are shown in columns (3) and (4), respectively.18
The results of the four models are presented inTable 3.
Board, % Politand% Indep are treated as endogenous
regressors in columns (3) and (4). Given the absence of
second order corelation in thefirst diference of the eror
term, and since the diference-in-Hansen test stil fails to
reject the hypothesis that the additional  moment
conditions are valid, the two-step GMM-sys estimator
(corected for heteroscedasticity) may be relied on.
The estimates reported in column (4) show that per capita
board compensation is strongly corelated tofirm dimen-
sion; smal and mediumfirms present significant lower
compensations than bigfirms (the omited variable), con-
firming the results previously obtained in the international
context. In the water sector, per capita board compensation
is also significantly low as compared to the energy sectors
(gas and electricity). The reason is twofold; on the one
hand, the water sector has traditionaly been the object of
a quite strong social control due to the evident welfare
implications of its functioning, and the levels of compensa-
tions have been moderated accordingly; on the other hand,
the increase in the level of competition (and the associated
managerial risk) in the energy sectors during the last decade
has pushed remuneration levels upwards.
The estimates also show that in Italian public utilities
per capita board compensation is negatively related to
board size, as in Fenget al.(2007)and Ryan and
Wiggins (2004). Consistently with the discussion in sec-
tion headed‘The determinants of compensation:firm size
and board size’, and assuming that in SOEs large boards
are less efective in fulfiling their monitoring role, one
could interpretprima faciethe negative impact of board
size as evidence of the reinforcement of monitoring bar-
riers, which can be raised by providing directors with a
suboptimal compensation package. However, diferent
from Fenget al.(2007)and Ryan and Wiggins (2004),
our dependent variable is per capita compensation and not
total compensation; so our results can simply reflect the
fact that directors are compensated according to the work-
load. Controling forfirm characteristics (such asfirm
size), it could be that larger boards alow duties to be
spread over more members resulting in less work per
director.19
15 We have also run regressions that consider board composition ‘in levels’, that is, withPolit, the number of politicians siting on the
board, andIndep, the number of independent directors, as explanatory variables. The results were very similar to the ones reported in
Table 3.
16 We used alternative measures of firm size, such as total assets (Assets), total headcount (N) or total revenues and the results are virtualy
unchanged.
17 Heaney (2009)stresses the importance of considering the relationship between board composition andfirm characteristics as
endogenous. Lei and Song (2012)show that there are problems of endogeneity within the corporate governance mechanisms of Hong
Kongfirms, although board structure and executive compensation are less afected.
18 Al estimates are performed using the xtabond2 procedure in Stata developed by Roodman (2009). In al cases the two step estimates
are reported with thefinite sample corection of the variance covariance matrix suggested by Windmeijer (2005).
19 Unfortunately, since we do not have proxies for workload (commitee assignments, number of meetings), we cannot directly test such
hypothesis. We are indebted to an anonymous referee for having raised this issue.
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In addition, the results show that the presence of politicaly
connected directors reduces the level of board remuneration,
in line with the arguments of Fenget al.(2007)and Joskow
et al.(1996)on the role of stakeholders who are pursuing
objectives which are diferent from profit maximization, and
who tend to avoid the endorsement of rich compensation
packages that would be very unpopular and judged as exces-
sively high by the press and the public opinion.
The estimates confirm the absence of a significant core-
lation between independent directors and board compensa-
tion. As in Fernandes (2008),thisfinding casts some doubts
about the monitoring role of nonexecutive directors and
suggests the need for a tighter definition of independence.
In order to analyse the relative impact of the diferent
regressors on the independent variable, we have computed
standardized (beta) coefficients. From the magnitude of the
standardzsed coefficients we can conclude that bothfirm
size and board size appear to be the most important deter-
minants of board pay. The other right hand side variables
exhibit nontrivial but comparatively lower coefficients.
In order to verify the existence of a relationship between
ownership structure, board composition,firm performance
and board compensation, as it emerges from the literature
ilustrated in Section I, we estimate the model as folows:
Per capita compit¼ β0þβ1sizeitþβ2G0itþβ3Xit
þβ4perfitþλtþηiþεit (2)
wherePer capita compitis the per capita board compensa-
tion infirmiat timet, sizeitis a measure offirm size andXit
is a set of industry dummies (Water, Electricity, Gas,
Multiutilities), as in model (1).G′itis a set of governance
variables:Board, % Politand% Indep refer to board
composition as in model (1);Azmun, AzspecandCorp,
are dummy variables denoting the juridical forms
‘Azienda municipalizzata’,‘Azienda speciale’and limited
company, respectively;Publock, LblockandPrblock, are
dummy variables indicating that the major shareholder is
a public entity like a Province, a Region or a Ministry, a
local municipality or a private subject, respectively.
Table 3. Board composition and per capita compensation: base 
model OLS Fixed efects GMM sys GMM sys2
Variables
Dependent variable:Per capita comp
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Board 4965*** 2177*** 2805** 2787**
(605.0) (518.9) (1234) (1359)
% Polit 3024*** 6965*** 5093* 4656*
(785.8) (2322) (2938) (2421)
% Indep 6301 3280 5907 3491
(4825) (7105) (34 947) (31 619)
Smal 24 414*** 9610** 18 183*** 18 445***
(3576) (4307) (5847) (5820)
Medium 12 161*** 2404 7558* 7676*
(3364) (2949) (4281) (4358)
Water 15 617*** 7701* 14 805** 15 185*
(4040) (4442) (7215) (7962)
Gas 6320** 6570 8004 8043
(3094) (4924) (6234) (4901)
Electricity 1938 1149 2621 2822
(3073) (4890) (4957) (5163)
Multiutilities 2404 2760 226.1 885.8
(4170) (2995) (6760) (6496)
Constant 106 063*** 43 142*** 91 020** 91 189***
(10 333) (11 034) (39 684) (34 064)
AR(2)pvalue 0.238 0.269
Hansen Sarganpvalue 0.912 0.965
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 715 715 715 715
Number offirms 106 106 106 106
Notes: Estimated models: OLS, Fixed Efects, GMM sys, GMM sys2.Per capita compis the total per capita compensation,Boardis
board size, %Indepand% Politidentify the percentage of independent and politicaly connected directors,SmalandMedium are
dummy variables identifyingfirms whose total assets fal in the 30th and 60th percentile.Gas, Water, Electricityare dummies forfirms
specialized in one sector only, whileMultiutilitiesidentifies diversified utilities running several businesses.
***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. SEs in parentheses.
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Finaly,perfitis a measure offirm performance, alterna-
tively ROIt1, ROAt1and ROEt120;λtis a time dummy,
ηian individual, time invariant variable andεitthe eror
term. The results of the two-step GMM-sys estimates of
model (2) are presented in columns (2), (3), (4) and (5) of
Table 4. Column (1) ofTable 4replicates the two-step
Table 4. Board composition and per capita compensation: extended model
Variables
Dependent variable:Per capita comp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Board 2787** 5132** 4914** 2756*** 5316**
(1359) (2419) (2472) (1249) (2216)
% Polit 4656* 2764** 4581** 5128** 8224*
(2421) (1178) (2812) (2949) (4838)
% Indep 3491 23 339 27 251 24 102 90 687
(31 619) (15 925) (17 070) (17 290) (126 129)
Smal 18 445***   20 321***   21 151***   19 003***   17 896***
(5820) (8231) (8245) (6445) (5923)
Medium 7676* 6312 4668 12 868**   6470*
(4358) (5115) (4885) (6224) (3776)
Water 15 185* 15 826**   15 360**   12 166 14 391***
(7962) (6729) (6800) (7878) (5345)
Gas 8043 5919 5138 2649 4089
(4901) (5195) (5893) (3941) (5537)
Electricity 2822 310.1 664.6 263.0 1038
(5163) (6452) (5489) (5143) (4589)
Multiutilities 885.8 2855 2775 3104 2687
(6496) (5977) (5375) (5262) (5616)
Azmun 18 522***   16 990***   16 757**   19 153**
(7042) (6428) (7142) (7570)
Azspec 13956***   12 854***   14 094* 13 166**
(5382) (4961) (7407) (5756)
Publock 24 792 18 542 12 971 17364
(31895) (25 503) (23 826) (29 810)
Prblock 2461 2313 4489 507.4
(7581) (8286) (10 371) (7553)
ROIt 1 654.3 21 234(29 895) (20 879)
ROAt 1 89 640(68 513)
ROEt 1 16 453(18 842)
ROIt 1* % Indep 130 212*(72 387)
Constant 91 189*** 179 761***   173 620***   83 531***   166 061***
(34 064) (55 569) (53 532) (27 025) (54 999)
AR(2)pvalue 0.269 0.103 0.105 0.223 0.117
Hansen Sarganpvalue   0.965 0.985 0.958 1.000 1.000
Time dummies yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 715 679 679 679 679
Number offirms 106 101 101 101 101
Notes: Estimated models: GMM sys2.Per capita compis the total per capita compensation,Boardis board size, %Indepand %Polit
are the percentage of independent and politicaly connected directors,SmalandMediumare dummy variables identifyingfirms whose
total assets fal in the 30th and 60th percentile.Gas, Water, ElectricityandMultiutilitiesare dummies for specialized and diversified
utilities.AzmunandAzspecare dummies accounting for the juridical forms Azienda Municipalizzata and Azienda Speciale,
respectively.Publockis a dummy variable forfirms whose blockholder is a State entity at the highest level (Ministry, Region,
Province, Central Bank, etc.), whilePrblockidentifies private blockholders.ROIis the return on invested capital,ROAis the return on
assets,ROEis the return on equity.
***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. SEs in parentheses.
20 The profitability ratios have been lagged in order to account for potential endogeneity problems. Notwithstanding the three measures
are highly corelated, our prefered measure is ROI. ROE is more appropriate for publicly tradedfirms, while ROA does not properly
reflect the capital profitability offirms, such as the ones in our sample, thatfinance their total assets more through accounting payables
than withfinancial debt.
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GMM-sys estimate of  model (1) for comparison
purposes.21
The results of the estimates of model (1) about board
size and composition,firm size and industry segment are
al confirmed; per capita board compensation is nega-
tively related to board size and to the incidence of poli-
ticaly connected directors; it is lower in smal and
mediumfirms with respect to bigfirms and in the water
sector with respect to the energy and the multiutilities
segments.
The estimates show a negative and significant efect of
the two juridical forms‘Azienda Municipalizzata’and
‘Azienda Speciale’. Therefore,firms that have undertaken
the corporatization process are granting higher compensa-
tion levels to their board members, consistent with the
view that, after being transformed into limited responsi-
bility companies, utilities are encouraged to hire the most
qualified directors. This interpretation is in line with
Cambini et al.(2011), who provide evidence that the
corporatization process is bringing efficiency gains (in
terms of cost reduction) for a sample of Italian local public
transportfirms observed over the years 1993–2002, and
with Menozziet al.(2012), whofind, for a larger sample
of utilities active in gas, water and electricity distribution,
that corporatization has a positive impact on accounting
measures of performance.
However, diferent from Firthet al.(2006,2007), the
estimates do not show any significant efect of ownership,
defined here on the basis of the public or private nature of
the major shareholder, on per capita board pay. Since legal
form and ownership type are obviously corelated vari-
ables, we have run regressions that include them sepa-
rately. We found a weakly significant and positive efect of
Prblockon board pay, which disappears when the legal
form dummies are included among the explanatory vari-
ables, suggesting that it is indeed the corporatization
process, rather than the presence of a private blockholder,
that captures most of the impact on board pay.22
Finaly, consistently with expectations (see the discus-
sion in section headed‘Remuneration and firm perfor-
mance’), wefind for the Italian public utilities that per
capita board compensation is not significantly corelated
with the profitability ratios. This is not surprising, since
most Italian public utilities are not listed and stock options
and incentives schemes have been almost absent until
now. We have also run regressions in which the presence
of a pay-for-performance link is tested by including the
interaction termsROIt 1*Prblock, ROIt 1*%Polit as wel
asROIt 1*%Indep.23OnlyROIt 1*%Indepshows up with
a positive and significant sign (column 5), suggesting that
the presence of independent directors has the efect of
increasing board pay only whenfirm performance
increases, according to the view that independent directors
somewhat help to align the interests of managers and
shareholders.24
V. Conclusions
Board compensation represents an important component
of thefirm’s incentive structure and corporate governance.
While this has been a highly debated topic with reference
to private and listedfirms, it has not been explored at al
for SOEs, in spite of the fact that board (as wel as execu-
tive) compensation schemes have been the object of some
important restructuring during the last two decades ofSOE
reforms in Europe and Asia. As for Italy, one early exam-
ple is the limit imposed to the compensation of SOEs’
directors by the budgetary law 296/2006, and a more
recent one is the 300 000 euro yearly wage cap for al
public administration executives set by law 214/2011 (the
so-caled decree‘Save Italy’).
The pay of top executives and board members in public
sector entities is important because it afects the entity’s
ability to atract, motivate and retain suitable talent.
However, if public sector companies pay too much, they
wil be criticized and pressured by the public opinion
because taxpayers wil see their tax euros wasted.
In this article, we propose to contribute to thisfield of
studies by investigating the relationship between board
compensation and governance mechanisms using a sam-
ple of 106 Italian public utilities observed for the years
1994–2004. During this period, the liberalization process
of the sector took place, changing the industrial and insti-
tutional environment. While ownership was stil in the
21 We have performed the step by step procedure as in model (1), and the results were again pointing towards prefering the two step
GMM sys model. The ful set of estimates for the OLS, Fixed Efects, GMM dif and GMM sys models are available upon request.
22 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting us such an interpretation.
23 As commented in section headed ‘Remuneration andfirm performance’, since we do not have information about the diferent
components of board compensation, we cannot explore into more depth the role of board composition and ownership in promoting
the implementation of incentive remuneration schemes.
24 As suggested by a referee, we enriched the model by including interaction terms betweenfirm size and blockholder type,firm size and
legal form, board size and blockholder type, board size and legal form, the percentage of politicians and legal form, and so on. While the
above results are confirmed for the noninteracted terms, the newly added regressors were not improving the explanatory power of the
model. In fact, almost al the interactions were exhibiting coefficients not significantly diferent from zero. The only exceptions were
relative to the variables%Polit*AzmunandBoard*Prblock, which both recorded a positive and significant coefficient. Therefore, there is
mild an evidence that the negative impact of politicians (of board size) on board pay is mitigated for firms directly managed by
municipalities (in the presence of a private blockholder).
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hands of the state and of the local municipalities, the
government was loosening its grip, more decision power
was transfered to the managers and private blockholders
were starting to invest in the sector.
The results of our estimates confirm some important
results reached in previous literature. First, boards are
beter remunerated in bigfirms and in the energy sector
with respect to the water sector. Second, per capita board
compensation is significantly negatively related to board
size. Third, the estimates highlight that there is no dis-
cernible link between board compensation and company
performance, confirming also for SOEs the doubts raised
by those (such as Goergen and Renneboog,2011)who
are rather sceptical about the efficaciousness of incentive
pay packages in aligning the interests of shareholders
with those of managers (and, in our case, with those
of directors in the three-level hierarchy shareholders–
directors–management).
As far as the ownership structure is concerned, the
public or private nature of the major shareholder is not
found to have an impact on board compensation.
However, the juridical form maters, since limited compa-
nies pay their directors more thanfirms with more tradi-
tional juridical forms like‘Azienda Municipalizzata’and
‘Azienda Speciale’.
Turning towards the efect of board composition, we
characterize directors on the basis of their status of insi-
ders, outsiders, independent, as wel as on their political
connectedness. Wefind that the proportion of politicians
siting in the board negatively influences the level of per
capita compensation, which seems to suggest that the
political influence within SOEs could lead to relation-
based rather than market-based contracts, where managers
and board members are typicaly political appointees with
careers and pay less subject to market forces.
Finaly, independent directors are found to positively
afect board pay only in corespondence with high perfor-
mance levels, a result consistent with the view that the
appointment of independent directors could be of some
help in reducing the agency problem between top execu-
tives and shareholders.
It is common wisdom that SOEs are afected by the
presence of multiple and potentialy conflicting objec-
tives, so that clear and good corporate governance prac-
tices are strongly required. Reforms have been introduced
in order to improve the performance of local public utili-
ties, but their efects could be neutralized by the activity of
self-interested CEOs and by the presence of weak board of
directors. Our results about the determinants of board
compensation suggest that reducing the number of politi-
cians and increasing instead the number of (truly) inde-
pendent directors could help in aligning the interests of
managers to the ones of shareholders.
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